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The contents of an individual's consciousness may be
divided, after Hume, into two distinct categories: Beliefs
about the way things are and desires about how he would like
them to be. On this view, only beliefs can be true or false,
while only desires can motivate action. A belief is impotent
withou t a desire but a desire is blind without a belief. Lan
guage may therefore be similarly divided into factual asser
tions and evaluative prescriptions, whichinclude moral judge
ments.
If I adopt anintrospectionist methodology then myclaims
to factual knowledge will encounter the problem of scepti
cism: First, whether the supposed referents of my descrip
tions, actually exist independently of my perceptions. And
second, if they do exist, how accurately my descriptions or
perceptions map onto them. That is, a gap is opened between
my claims to factual knowledge and the truth of those claims.
Wittgenstein argues in his Private Language Argument
that the failure of these attempts to ward off scepticism
derives from the methodology they assume. If the solitary
introspectionist is left as the sole interpreter of his conscious
ness he will never be able to distinguish something's being
the case from it seeming to be the case. The application of a
conceptually meaningful language must be governed ac
cording to generally accepted rules; and successful rule
following necessitates at least one other conscious individual.
A meaningful language must be public. This provides a
possibility of disagreement which ensures that a concept
delineates some particular thing. If this is correct then the
sceptic seems to defeat himself since he must presuppose that
the questions he poses are themselves meaningful. Claims to
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factual knowledge can therefore be reasonably supposed to
avoid complete referential failure and the precision of their
mapping onto this independent reality becomes a matter of
correctly following the applicatory rules which govern the
concepts involved.
A similar analysis can be carried out on moral language.
It maybe either public or private. If moral language is viewed
introspectively then it seems that two sceptical questions can
again be asked: First whether good and bad actually exist
independently of the introspectionist's feelings and, second,
if they do, how well these evaluations correspond to that
objective realm.
However, the moral introspectionist is aware, after
Wittgenstein, that the adoption of his position has a certain
consequence: It forces him to deny the existence of objective
moral facts, that is, generally accepted rules of application.
What I have called moral introspection therefore amounts to
ethical subjectivism: the view that moral interlocutors are
solely concerned with their private feelings. Here, moral
judgements, unlike factual ones, simply represent linguistic
expressions of an underlying sentiment. They cannot, and
therefore do not, relate to any objective realm in the same way
that the propositions of factual language do. In other words,
the theory is necessarily anti~realist.
Moral realism, on the other hand, views moral language
as being public. It asserts that moral language is meaningful
in the same sense as factual language. The application of
moral concepts being governed, either actually or poten
tially, by generally accepted rules which are learned within
the language-using community. The aim of this essay is to
examine whether or not a truly subjective theory of moral
language is possible.
In assessing the moral worth of any agent it seems that
two distinct factors have to be considered: His moral opin
ions and his actions. I lnight agree with someone that I
believe it is wrong to cause others to passively inhale ciga
rette smoke but nevertheless be responsible for occasioning
precisely that state of affairs only five minutes later. I lnight
remark that "I know it's wrong, but I really feel like a
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cigarette./I Thus, moral theories try to explain how discus
sion is related to practice.
Moral discussion is concerned with reasons for acting
one way or another. In the above case there are two possible
reasons for action. First, my belief that having a cigarette
would be wrong and, second, my strong desire to have a
cigarette five minutes later. Both the subjectivist and realist
admit that the moral reasons supplied by an agent imply that
he has a motivation to act accordingly and are aware that the
Humean picture indicates that only desires can motivate.
The subjectivist claims that this demonstrates that appar
ent moral beliefs employed in discussion are actually expres
sions of desires. But it will still remain for him to provide a
plausible account of a moral discussion, given that we do feel
we are talking about something. The realist asserts that the
judgements employed in discussion are beliefs which can be
true or false, that is, there are or could be, generally accepted
rules which govern their application. But, if he is to link
discussion to practice, he must show how such beliefs are
able to motivate.
Ihave already dismissed ethical subjectivism in its simple
form: The idea that moral judgements report one's attitude
towards an issue. Here, a statement such as "stealing is
wrong" is equivalent to "I do not approve of stealing". As
long as I am sincerely reporting my feelings I cannot be
wrong. For example I may, on reflection, conclude that
stealing is, in fact, morally permissible. But, logically, mytwo
conflicting evaluations cannot both be right. Second, moral
disagreements do exist. But, by claiming that being correct is
a matter of sincerely reporting one's feelings, simple subjec
tivism has the absurd consequence of admitting that both
speakers are correct.
Expressivist theories, such as emotivism, are more prom
ising. Instead of asserting that moral judgements report
one's attitude, emotivism claims that they are performative
expressions of desires which are designed to influence the
behaviour and attitudes ofothere. Saying stealing is wrong"
is the same as saying "boo to stealing!". Since these expres
II
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sions can be neither true nor false the objections to simple
subjectivism are avoided.
But emotivism must also provide a satisfactory account
of moral discussion. The emotivist seems to be committed to
saying that moral reasons are those statements which are
considered the most likely to influence the behaviour and
attitudes of others. For example, I might convince you that
voluntary euthanasia is right, on purely psychological
grounds, by revealing that your favourite pop star endorses
it.
Because emotivism does not seem to require that the
reasons employed in discussion are relevant to the issue ithas
generally been rejected. In order to maintain a subjectivist
stance, some have stipulated that only those desires which
are expressed subsequent to a thorough deliberation can be
counted as moral reasons. Such a process is deemed likely to
shape the agent's feelings by bringing to light relevant facts
and possible consequences which had not previously been
considered.
But it is possible, and perhaps probable, that strong
differences of opinion would still remain. A further modifi
cation attempts to overcome this. The final version of subjec
tivism states that a moral opinion is correct only if one also
considers that it would also be sustained by someone who
was completely reasonable and impartial.
I will now examine how realists may attempt to make
sense of moral practice. Smith provides the following ex
ample. You are bathing a screaming baby and are motivated
to drown him which, on the Humean view, suggests that you
have a reason to do so which is beyond rational criticism. But
this is counter-intuitive.
According to Smith, common sense indicates that "the
desire is not worth satisfying" because you believe that you
would not be motivated to drown the baby if you were cool
calm and collected". Thus he concludes that moral beliefs are
not based on our actual motivations but on" the independent
rational ideal" of those desires which we would have under
ideal conditions of reflection. It is beliefs about these desires
which provide reasons for action. For the belief about what
1/
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I would desire under ideal conditions, about what I have a
reason to desire, provides a motivation not to drown the
baby. Therefore I am not beyond rational criticism if I do so.
One problem remains. Would beliefs about desires un
der ideal conditions converge for different agents in the same
physical circumstances? Smith asserts, contrary to the claims
of many, that the nature of moral discussion indicates that
such a convergence would occur.
Returning to the example which initiated this discussion:
The subjectivist will say that my statement "I know it's wrong
to smoke in public" did not really purport to state a moral
fact. It was nothing more than a verbal gesture motivated by
one of two factors: First, it was not a representation of my
feelings towards smoking but a representation of my stron
ger desire to appease my non-smoking friend. Second, it was
a representation of my desire to stop smoking in public,
subsequent to an impartial deliberation, whose intentionwas
to motivate others and, perhaps, myself into according with
it. If this latter possibility is accepted then my subsequent
action was simply a result of a stronger desire to have a
cigarette. And, since this stronger desire was not the result of
an impartial and rational consideration, I acted wrongly.
The moral realist, on the other hand, will say that my
statement was indeed a claim to moral knowledge. He may
say that being cool, calm and collected" my statement that
"I know it's wrong to smoke in public" did claim to state a
moral fact. Five minutes later and still aware of my belief that
if I was "cool, calm and collected" I would not desire a
cigarette, but now craving nicotine, I failed to desire what I
believed I ought to and, as such, acted wrongly.
Both these theories, in their final formulations, appear to
be fundamentally similar in proposing that desires may be
shaped by reason and, as a consequence, are likely to con
verge among different agents giving rise to genuinely moral
desires. Significantly, both theories assume thatthephenom
enon of rational moral discussion indicates an implicit pre
sumption by all of the possibility of such a converge. As a
result, both attempt to remove strong and potentially
/I
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distortive personal feelings by positing considerations such
as impartial deliberation and beliefs about one's views in
better circumstances.
It is unclear why the subjectivist who was initially iden
tified as a moral introspectionist identifies moral reasons as
being impartial. His methodology, if he is to remain a true
introspectionist, does not permit him to presuppose the
existence of other moral agents, just as the Cartesian cannot
presuppose the existence of an external world. But if the
subjectivist is not entitled to draw into his considerations the
approval of an imaginary ideal moral agent then he is forced
to remain at the stage where the desires between moral
interlocutors will simply continue to conflict. Of course,
Smith's proposal, that the beliefs about what sort of desires
we ought to have will converge, is necessitated by his realism,
even if it is unfounded.
Thus, both these theories propose that moral discussion
converges toward a set of specifically moral desires and in
this sense they are both objective. To the realist the relevant
desire is thatwhich we would all have under ideal conditions
of reflection. To the subjectivist, it is the desire which would
be rationally and impartially approved of. I will now exam
ine why the subjectivist has collapsed into objectivism and
whether or not this can be avoided.
The subjectivist identifies two aspects of morality: Ac
tions and discussions, while also recognising that something
must initiate and then sustain the latter. He proposes that
moral discussion is initiated by a clash of desires, of which
spoken reasons are performative expressions. But now he
must explain how the conversation is sustained. He rejects
the idea that reasons are simply those statements which will
most effectively alter the psychological state of his opponent,
and that this is the goal which sustains the conversation. He
claims that, empirically, a moral reason appears to be more
than this: It is the expression of a desire which remains after
a rational and impartial deliberation of facts and possible
outcomes. But by introducing rational deliberation and
impartiality he suggests that desires will converge, and
thereby converts his theory into an objective one. Presum
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ably, the moral conversation is sustained by this process of
convergence.
The subjectivist is correct in denying the emotivist's
assertion that any fact which has the desired psychological
effect can be counted as a moral reason. Moral discussions
do have a distinctive language, often based around consider
ations of impartiality. But the subjectivist seems to be relying
on the premise that expressions directly represent the under
lying desire: For example, that the use of a concept such as
impartiality indicates an actual desire to be impartial.
But this premise seems incorrect. Whenamanuallabourer
says that it is unfair for a company director to earn his yearly
wage in a month, is it to be supposed that his statement is not
at all the expression of an egoistic desire? Similarly, when
such a director replies that, since his company generates
wealth for the whole community and he is only motivated to
work extremely hard when paid a competitive salary, his pay
canbe impartially justified through its maximisation of over
all utility.
While the language here is centered around impartiality
there does not appear to be a convergence of desires, but
merely two parallel expressions of egocentricity. The cause
seems to be the inherent vagueness and redefinability of
moral concepts. Impartiality, for example,. does not relate
only to material goods, but also to interests, preferences,
needs and aggregate utility.
So a desire which produces an expression of impartiality
might actually be wholly egoistic. This suggests a distinction
between the desire a moral judgement seems to express and
the desire which it actually expresses. This subjective thesis
(5) would thus claim that rational deliberation and attempted
impartiality do not shape one's desires, rather one's desires
shape how facts and concepts must be employed in order tha t
those desires are fulfilled. And therefore, moral reasons are
a sub-set of intentionally psychologically effective state
ments, namely those which can be used to satisfy desires in
terms of the culturally favoured moral concepts.
5 concludes that, if the possibility of using moral lan
.guage exists, that is of consciously saying to one's self "I can
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satisfy egoistic desires by making them appear altruistic"
then the use of moral language itself becomes morally ques
tionable. If this happens then moral discussion becomes
synonymouswith moral practice andis not further analysable,
since every analysis imports a morally questionable motive.
Given that this exactly what moral theorists attempt to do
it follows from S that they are not talking about moral
discussion but partaking in it or, more accurately, simply
continuing to act. They may therefore be asked whether their
theories are themselves the result of morally questionable
desires: One might wonder, for example, whether some
realists propose moral theories which marginalise the so
called mentally ill because of a dislike for such persons.
The objectivist might reply that while the rules governing
moral concepts are not presently dear the dialectical process
of moral discussion will eventually converge upon the truth
about which desires are good. But if S is true how is such a
convergence possible when the employment of opinions
which are to facilitate this process are themselves amenable
to moral criticism? Surely the morality of applying moral
language must first be established, by a similar dialectic. But,
of course, a vicious regress would ensue.
While S is superficially attractive it would not actually be
possible, on the subjectivist view, to consciously mask an
egoistic desire as an impartial one. This is because S relies on
the false premise that the individual has his own meaningful
concept of altruism and egoism, while others are unable to
access his real desires. Take the following two sentences: A:
I gave to charity from an egoistic desire to relieve my con
science and B: I gave to charity from an altruistic desire to
help others. If a private rule governed language is impos
sible then the subjectivist must admit that I will be unable to
tell A from seeming to be A. Thus, I cannot meaningfully
employ the terms egoism and altruism. If I apply them it is
simply as if I am saying to myself "don't bother giving to
charity" or well done for giving to charity" in order to shape
my future desires. And if "I" is replaced with "John" then I
still cannot tell A from seeming to be A and, again the terms
refer to nothing. If I af:jsume A is the case them I am sayin~
II
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IIThumbs down about John giving to charity" and if I assume
B, "Well done to John for giving to charity". Again, I am
attempting to alter the attitudes that people take regarding
his action and therefore, indirectly, the chances of him, or
someone else, repeating it. This applies equally to other
moral interlocutors. The origin of an individual's evaluation
of their own or another's desires will be discussed shortly.
Thus these attributions are primarily aimed at the action,
not the agent. It should also be noted that they do not purport
to describe something inherent in the action itself because, in
the absence of applicatory rules, seeming to be amount to
being. Rather they intend to either commend or disparage
that type of action in order to encourage or discourage its
performance. It is likely, from an evolutionary perspective,
that we have developed a particular psychological sensi tivi ty
to moral praise or blame, perhaps due to an association with
physical reward or punishment. Thus moral language may
have evolved as a specialised behaviour regulating mecha
nism. If the expressions of desires by moral interlocutors do
have this attitude influencing role then the emotivist may
propose a deterministic model of moral discussion.
The perceived moral worth of a certain action within a
community, and therefore the likelihood of it being per
formed, becomes the aggregate of individual expressions for
and against it. Behaviours will tend towards the prescribed
direction with a speed roughly proportionate to the imbal
ance of opinion. The origin of each individual's evaluation of
personal or public actions becomes a net result of opinions
expressed by friends, parents, the media etc. This is more
plausible when it is coupled with the overwhelming desire
that each individual has to be part of the community and to
enjoy the obvious personal benefits which that brings. In
addition, biological and social factors, such as genetic simi
larity or social relationship, may determine the extent to
which moral assertions impact upon individual evaluations
of given desires. The development of an individual's own
desires will be influenced by factors such as material wealth
and physical predisposition. An individual will tend to
perform those actions which he desires and perceives as most
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worthwhile.
Thus, moral discussion governs a self-regulating system
of behaviours to maintain the community's stability or some
other unknown factor. Each discussion is an exchange of
expressions of desire, on a local level, designed to psycho
logically determine the behaviours which will be most useful
in that respect. Despite appearances, this model remains
essentially subjective.
First, each moral assertion is still the expression of an
individual desire even though that desire is largely the result
of factors external to him. Second, and more importantly, the
factors impinging on the community, for example the pros
perity and health of its individuals, are dynamic and some
times extreme. Thus there will never be a particular set of
actions which will consistently maintain the stability of the
community and which will, therefore, be consistently pro
moted or discouraged. That is the application ofmoral concepts
will never be governed by generally accepted rules. In addition,
the effect of different impinging factors will be likely to vary
among different individuals according to their physical dif
ferences and within the same individual at different times.
These dynamics should be compared with factual language
whose rules, while not static, change very slowly. However,
the publicity of moral language may vary from being almost
wholly rule governed, for example in a religious climate, to
almost the opposite extreme.
Every culture has prevalent pairs of moral polar oppo
sites for describing actions. Ours is dominated by altruism
and egoism. In addition to these descriptive terms are pairs
of consequential terms which purport to describe the state of
affairs which an action produces. These include maximum
utility-minimum utility, equality-inequality and fairness
unfairness. With both sets of terms, it is the first member of
each pair which is deemed morally preferable and whose
attribution to an action is intended to promote it.
The nature of moral language is such that an environmen
tal factor necessitating the promotion of previously discour
aged actions does not necessitate an immediate change in
vocabulary. Moral concepts are peculiar in that they lend
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themselves well to the prescription of contrary behaviours.
In a sense they seem to contain their opposites. For example,
the ideal of equality dictates that people are treated equally.
But this means nothing by itself It might imply that as a
doctor I administer the same amount of pain killer to all
patients. But the principle of diminishing marginal utility
seems to indicate that I administer it in a way which will
result in the greatest reduction of aggregate pain. And this
implies that, while interests are to be treated equally, indi
viduals are not. By being impartial in one sense I may be
partial in another and vice-versa. Thus a morality which
favours impartiality might come to emphasise need, and this
mayor may not supersede impartiality as the central tenet of
moral discussion. Indeed impartiality may become a deroga
tory term if the actions which were once beneficial become
the cause of harm in the community. In this way moral
vocabulary evolves and diversifies but the nature of the
terms is always such that they may refer to very different
actions, according to the qualifications which are continually
being appended to them.
The deterministic emotivism that I have suggested here
still remains subjective in many respects. Perhaps most
importantly it does not assign to moral discussion a static set
of criteria which govern the type of desire converged to
wards. Nevertheless, the fact that individual evaluations of
desires are largely determined by the expressions of others
does seem to base the model on impartiality. However, there
will be many situations where the greatest benefit to the
community will be produced if a small number of individu
als, perhaps doctors, are treated preferentially. Furthermore,
individuals may be impartial in this sense in order to benefit
personally from belonging to the community. Perhaps it is
not incompatible with any impartially grounded theory,
whether nominally subjective or objective, to say that all
moral discussion is fundamentally the expression of an ego
centric and biological desire not to be marginalised from
society.
The adoption of an emotivist stance is supported by
Festinger's theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957) which has
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continued to receive strong empirical support. This suggests
that an agent's beliefs about his past actions and his attitudes
are engaged in a dynamic equilibrium which minimises the
dissonance arising from the inconsistencies between those
cognitions. Neither assumes any long term priority in this
process. If, as this suggests, attitude and action are indistin
guishable kinds then, given that desires motivate action, it
must also be admitted that they motivate moral opinion.
The Humean thesis needs to be supplanted by a holistic
appreciation of the essential similarity between both moral
assertions and actions and, if Smith is right, moral beliefs and
desires. This would unite desires, moral beliefs, and actions
as the same kind of happenings. If moral discussion is to be
likened more to physical behaviour than factual language,
then moral philosophy might do well to view itself as an
undistinguished part of human behaviour, rather than as a
privileged and distanced meditation upon it.
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